Evil as an Aesthetic Concept by Jensen, Rasmus Ugilt Holten
05 52
Volume
Rasmus Ugilt Holten Jensen  is an assistant professor in the Department of Cul-
ture and Society (Philosophy), Aarhus University.
kvarter
a ademisk
academic quarter
Evil as an Aesthetic Concept
Introduction
It should be quite easy to observe that there has been an overwhelm-
ing increase in popular usages of the concept of evil since events 
termed simply by the dual integers 9/11.  The way the academic 
community has reacted to the (re)emergence of the signifier “evil” in 
public discourse can, I believe without cutting too many corners, be 
divided into three general trends.  First there are the ethico-political 
discussions and investigations, which more or less take the concept 
at face value.  Unsurprisingly quite a few commentators have em-
barked on this road.  These jurists, philosophers, political scientists 
etc.  all agree upon the notion that terrorism has emerged as the new 
(radical) evil, which liberal democracies are forced to take issue with 
and stern action against.  A telling book title in this tradition is Mi-
chael Ignatieff’s The Lesser Evil (2005).  Here, Ingatieff predictably 
argues that it is sometimes necessary to bend our attachment to fun-
damental human rights in order to prevent the greater evil of terror-
ism.  Secondly there are the philosophical investigations into what 
the concept of evil could at all be taken to mean:  “What is evil?” the 
philosophers ask.  Richard Bernstein (2002), Susan Nieman (2004) 
are prominent representatives.  As a very general rule, philosophers 
who take up this path tend to be weary of the very immediate un-
derstanding given to the concept of evil in most political discourse, 
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but rather than investigating the effects the frequent usage of the 
concept might have, they prefer to ask how we can be justified in 
calling things, actions, events or persons evil.  Thirdly there are the 
more discourse-analytically inclined investigations into how human 
relations are structured by the usage of such morally defined signi-
fiers.  Joanna Zylinska (2005; 2006), Stephen Chan (2005) and Judith 
Butler (2004; 2005) represent this trend.  Here the well-known argu-
ment goes as follows:  By referring to your political, social or inter-
national adversary as evil, you immediately justify taking actions 
against him or her that you wouldn’t normally condone.  
What unites all of these approaches is the generally accepted idea 
that the concept “evil” is a moral or ethical one.  The central point 
of this article is to challenge this idea.  It will be argued that the 
crucial function, which the concept serves, is often aesthetic rather 
than ethical; what we end up saying, when we point out that some-
one is “evil”, is not that the person is unjust or acting against certain 
fundamental moral principles; what we are saying is that the per-
son pointed out is disgusting, degenerate, revolting or otherwise 
aesthetically unacceptable.
Evil and Human Rights
At first, however, I should like to make clear why an investigation 
of the specific scope of the concept of evil must be crucial for the 
understanding of human rights in the first place.  It may not be im-
mediately clear to the reader of juridical texts that the concept of 
evil is particularly pertinent.  If one takes two of the most pertinent 
cases from the European Court of Human Rights concerning the 
issue of anti-terrorism legislation and the problems they pose for 
Human Rights, namely the cases of A and Others vs.  The United 
Kingdom (ECHR Grand Chamber, 2009) and of Gillian and Quinton 
vs.  The United Kingdom (ECHR Fourth Section, 2010), and carefully 
goes through the final verdicts, one will not see the concept of evil 
being used a single time.1  
It is not, however, as a specific juridical concept that evil is be-
ing considered in any case.  Rather, in the approaches mentioned 
1 In both cases the Court argued that the UK had gone too far in its counter-
terrorism measures and that certain forms of policing and detaining suspects 
of terrorism would have to be changed.  The finer details of the verdicts, how-
ever, are beyond the scope of the present paper.  
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above, evil is being viewed as a specific moral or ethical category, 
which can form part of the background of social, political and ju-
ridical interaction.  In other words:  if terrorism is being viewed as 
a great new evil, against which society allows itself to take ex-
traordinary measures, then this particular notion of evil is bound 
to form some of the background against which judges make their 
decisions in human rights cases.  One can argue that this is an en-
tirely necessary tendency or one can argue that it is an extremely 
dangerous one, but as legal scholars such as Oren Gross, Fionnu-
ala Ní Aoláin, William Stuntz and many others have argued it is a 
well proven fact of the sociology of law, that judges tend to “go to 
war” when society does (Gross and Ní Aoláin, 2006, 77).  
One cannot read Fourth Amendment cases from the 1980s 
without sensing judicial attention to the pros and cons of 
the war on drugs – even when the cases did not involve 
drug crime.  Crack dealers were the most salient crime 
problem a dozen years ago; now, terrorists occupy that 
place (Stuntz 2002, 77).
When concepts of new and great evils emerge and begin to play a 
dominant role in public discourse, it is bound to have some effect 
on the state of human rights.  It is with this in mind that we should 
approach my argument that the functioning of the concept of evil 
in public discourse can often belong to the realm of aesthetics rath-
er than ethics.  
Ethical Violence
Since it is the functioning of the concept that is the target, it seems 
natural that the third group of theorists mentioned above will be 
in focus.  The danger that is identified by discourse-analytical ap-
proaches to the proliferation of the concept of evil is that a mor-
alization of discourse could lead to a kind of ethical violence. 
Closely related to this idea is of course the binary logic that those 
who are fighting the “evil” ones automatically posit themselves 
as good.  Joanna Zylinska, author of the book The Ethics of Cul-
tural Studies (2005) gives a paradigmatic example of how this ap-
proach argues:  
kvarter
a ademisk
academic quarter
Volume
Evil as an Aesthetic Concept
Rasmus Ugilt Holten Jensen
05 55
[I]n the US as well as the UK ‘9/11’ has played a sym-
bolic role in founding a new moral sensibility.  This po-
litical moralism has underpinned the all-encompassing 
‘war on terror’ unequivocally championed by Bush and 
Blair and fought against an invisible enemy, ‘terror’ itself.  
And it is through recourse to moral rhetoric, a discourse 
of good and evil, that a difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
has been established in this war […] Positioning ‘9/11’ as 
an extraordinary, apocalyptic event after which ‘nothing 
will ever be the same’ has been part of this moral agenda, 
which attempts to legitimate military intervention with 
references to transcendent concepts and values (Zylinska 
2006, 72).  
In this line of thought it would seem that “ethical violence” means 
the kind of violence that is made possible by the binary logic of a 
radical separation of “us” and “them”.  What is called “ethical 
violence” functions in virtue of some form of exclusion – it is a 
symbolic form of violence, which excludes by making ethical 
judgements (such as “A is evil”).  Exactly how such exclusive prac-
tice is carried out is still a question to be answered though.  As 
should be clear from the introduction, the present argument 
makes the point that the kind of exclusion, which takes place in 
relation to “ethical violence” is not really ethical at all, but rather 
aesthetic.
This could seem to be a hard claim to validate.  A violence that 
is aimed at furthering “good” and eradicating “evil” would ac-
cording to many be the very definition of “ethical violence”.  As a 
first step towards countering this intuition it will be spelled out in 
detail how such a notion of ethical violence should be understood. 
This will be done by taking up the notion, as it is being developed 
by Judith Butler in her Giving an Account of Oneself (2005).  The 
reason for choosing Butler here is that her approach draws upon 
ideas which should be seen as crucial for any research project 
within what is rightly termed discourse analysis:  crucially that 
the human subject cannot be seen as a fundamental and self-trans-
parent essence; that it instead in some way or other is decentred, 
out of joint or inaccessible to itself.  
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Butler on Ethical Violence
What then is contained in Butler’s notion of “ethical violence”? 
As the title of the book would suggest, Butler chooses a specific 
strategy for describing the fundamentally precarious character of 
the human subject in Giving an Account of Oneself.  This strategy 
focuses on the issue of self-narration and the fundamental impos-
sibility thereof.  She makes two points that are crucial for us:  “[T]
here is (1) a non-narrativizable exposure that establishes my sin-
gularity” (Butler 2005, 39) and there is “the structure of address in 
which it takes place” (ibid).  
By the “non-narrativizable exposure that establishes my singular-
ity” Butler alludes to the duality of the self, revealed whenever I give 
a narration of myself.  First there is the “I,” being narrated, and sec-
ondly there is the “I” which emerges as the narrator of the story.  The 
non-narrativizable exposure is that which occurs, when this second 
I realizes that it is impossible for it to narrate its own emergence 
within the confines of the first narration.  Any attempt at such an 
inclusion of this second “I” in the narration would only lead to the 
emergence of a new (a third) “I” that would be narrating the inclu-
sion of the second in the narrative of the first.  This structural dis-
crepancy within any narration of the self is a fundamental problem-
atic, which no narrative practice will ever be able to overcome.  
With the “structure of address,” Butler argues that whatever we 
do, when we give an account of ourselves, it necessarily takes the 
form of an address.  Every narration implicates the “you” to whom 
I am telling my story.  This also means that every narration involves 
the exposure of myself to this “you”.  Given that every narration 
involves a necessary discrepancy at the very core of the narrating 
self, this means that I expose my very lack of transparency to “you” 
whenever I address myself to you.  Building upon this idea Butler 
argues that ethics is possible within the structure of address, where 
I ask “Who are you?” while recognizing that the other, to whom I 
put my question, is conditioned by the very same inaccessibility to 
her own narrative, by which I am bound.  
Butler’s overall point regarding human relations therefore is 
that genuine ethics is possible not because human beings are self-
transparent and therefore responsible entities, but exactly because 
the lack of self-transparency conditions us to understand ourselves 
through our exposure to the other.  Ethics is that which takes place 
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between subjects who are unable to fully come to terms with their 
own being.2 
What does all this have to do with the notion of ethical violence? 
The point is straightforward:  if the basic condition of being a hu-
man subject is that one is in an opaque relation to oneself, and if 
ethics is that which occurs in the field where subjects do or do not 
recognize each other in terms of this basic condition, then ethical 
violence is that which takes place when subjects force transparency 
upon each other.  If I cannot accept my own opacity, chances are 
that I will not be able accept it in you.  Butler formulates it in the 
following way:  “Suspending the demand for self-identity or, more 
particularly, for complete coherence seems to me to counter a cer-
tain ethical violence, which demands that we manifest and maintain 
self-identity at all times and require that others do the same” (Butler 
2005, 42).  Butler continues on to say that this suspending is exactly 
what is meant by her founding the ethical relation in the question 
“Who are you?” The ethical way of asking this question is to insist 
upon asking it and never cede.  The moment we stop asking that 
question is the moment we say “now I know who you are” (Butler 
2005, 43).  In other words the ethical way of dealing with the other 
is to follow (Butler’s version of) the Lacanian dictum to never “cede 
upon your desire [for the other]” (ibid.), it means to insist that the 
question “Who are you?” can never be given a satisfying answer.  
Butler expands upon the situation in which “I know who you are” 
by turning her attention to what she calls ethical judgment.  The 
fundamental form of the judgment is “A is X”.  In a judgment we 
ascribe a property to someone or something – in some way or other 
we define, what it is.  In a judgment we therefore draw a clear line of 
differentiation between the judge and the judged.  Butler does not 
want to argue that we should suspend ethical judgment altogether, 
but she vehemently argues that any ethical judgment that we make 
are conditioned by a prior relation of recognition:  “Prior to judging 
an other, we must be in some relation to him or her.  This relation 
will ground and inform the ethical judgments we finally do make. 
We will, in some way, have to ask the question “Who are you?” (But-
2  In this way Butler reveals herself to be a certain kind of Hegelian (Butler 2005, 
41).  That being said she is a reluctant one:  “There is lots of light in the Hege-
lian room, and the mirrors have the happy coincidence of being windows as 
well” (ibid.).
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ler 2005, 45).  To Butler, ethical judgement is only truly ethical if it is 
made against the background of the original situation of mutual rec-
ognition of the impossibility of self-identity.  
The form of ethical violence which is entailed in insisting upon 
understanding the other as a “whole” person – as someone who can 
be expected to be and to know what he is and what he wants – is not 
the only one however.  This becomes clear in her discussion of con-
demnations.  She writes:  “[C]ondemnation is very often an act that 
not only “gives up on” the one condemned but seeks to inflict a vio-
lence upon the condemned in the name of “ethics”” (Butler 2005, 
46).  Here we should detect a certain shift in the meaning “ethical 
violence.” In the discussion above, ethical violence meant insisting 
that the other should uphold a kind of self-identity; here on the oth-
er hand ethical violence is what takes place where the condemned 
other is “given up upon”, i.e.  precisely posited as something wholly 
other than the speaker.  To be sure, we find the general form of judg-
ment “A is X” at the bottom of each of these types of ethical violence. 
This makes impossible a genuine and continued questioning “who 
are you.”  Nonetheless, the difference should be obvious.  
In the first instance ethical violence is a kind of subjectivization; as 
the inclusion of the other into the community of self-identical sub-
jects.  In the second instance ethical violence is performed as a kind 
of exclusion.  A condemnation draws a sharp line of distinction be-
tween the judge and the judged, where the judged is no longer al-
lowed in the ethical community of the judge.  
Having established this distinction, we can take the further step of 
distinguishing between the forms of violence that is entailed.  When 
ethical violence is conducted in the form of subjectivization, the aim 
is to form human beings into a certain kind of ethical substance. 
Here we find the disciplinary, educational, pastoral, sexual etc… 
forms of violence discussed and investigated by Butler herself and 
of course by Michel Foucault (e.g.,  in 1991).  However, when ethical 
violence is conducted in the form of condemnation, something quite 
different takes place.  A person judged to be evil in this way is ex-
actly not a possible target of disciplinary uses of force or violence, 
because there is nothing there to be disciplined.  He or she is neither 
posited as a self-identical subject, nor recognized as standing in an 
opaque relation to him or herself.  Instead, such a person is a possi-
ble target of exterminatory or rather cleansing uses of violence.  
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Kant and Aesthetic Judgement
At this point we should be able to make an argument for why what 
is often discussed as ethical violence could be better understood as 
aesthetic violence by taking up a famous distinction from Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment.  I think here of the distinction between the 
beautiful and the sublime.  
A crucial point about the judgments about the sublime and the 
beautiful is that they are what Kant understood as reflective judg-
ments.  This means that they are not descriptive or determinate 
judgments about what an object is, but rather ways of reflecting 
upon the cognitive capacities we utilize in order to make judge-
ments in the first place.  In the determinate judgment “The rose is 
red” we subsume an object (the rose) to a concept (red), i.e.,  we 
move from the concept to the object.  In the reflective judgement 
“the rose is beautiful,” such a move is not possible because, so 
argues Kant, we do not have a determinate concept of the beauti-
ful in the same way as we have a determinate concept of redness. 
This means that a different kind of necessity is at work in reflec-
tive judgments than is the case in determinate judgements.  Kant 
calls it subjective necessity.  
The subjective necessity involved in judgements of beauty is 
best understood through a specific kind of ought.  To make the 
judgment that something is beautiful entails a commitment to the 
belief that everyone else ought to find the same thing beautiful 
(Kant 2001, 212).  Upon the experience of something beautiful in 
nature, I feel that the beautiful object is formed in exactly such a 
way that it is as if it were teleologically suited to my specific cogni-
tive capacities.  In a reflective judgment we are judging upon the 
very feeling, which arises from the experience of some object.  The 
“as if of the judgment is what corresponds to this very feeling.  It 
is as if the rose was made exactly with me in mind, when I find it 
beautiful.  Crucially however this very feeling that it is as if the 
rose was made with someone like me in mind, does not mean that 
the judgements of the beautiful are based upon the experience of 
a solipsistic subject detached from any kind of community.  Ex-
actly because of the feeling that it is as if the rose was made with 
me in mind, it is also as if it was made with everyone else in mind, 
who share my specific human capacities for judgement.  
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In the end that is what leads to the idea of a sensus communis 
(Gemeinsinn) in Kant’s analysis of reflective judgment.  Because the 
judgement of beauty commits me in the described way, I can get 
the feeling of belonging to the community of human beings, who 
have the same cognitive capacities as I do, through the experience 
of the beautiful thing (Kant 2001,  236ff.).
Where the beautiful gives us a feeling of teleologically belonging 
in the world, because it is as if the beautiful objects were made to 
suit our cognitive capacities, the exact opposite is the case with re-
gard to the sublime.  The feeling we experience when we experi-
ence the sublime is that it is as if it was made specifically with the 
transgression of our cognitive capacities in mind (Kant 2001, 246). 
The sublime is that which is large (the mathematically sublime) or 
powerful (the dynamically sublime) beyond measure.  We simply 
cannot comprehend the magnitude and ferocity of the sublime.  In-
deed, as Kant puts it, “sublime is what even to be able to think 
proves that the mind has a power surpassing any standard of 
sense” (Kant 2001, 250).  
How do these notions of the sublime and the beautiful fit with 
the normativity inherent in the types of ethical violence we extract-
ed above? I believe that they can be shown to fit well.  
Ethical violence in the sense of what we have described as Fou-
cauldian subjectivization above could be translated into a form of 
aesthetic violence.  Here, aesthetics is modelled upon the Kantian 
judgement of the beautiful.  Such a translation would even refine 
our understanding of the violence entailed in the types of judge-
ment that could be said to fit the knowledge “I know who you are” 
most prominently, i.e., “you are a woman,” “you are a man,” “you 
are normal,” or “you are responsible.” Judgements of this kind are 
not simply violent in the sense that they subsume a person to a given 
concept and directly impose a repressive structure.  Rather their 
functioning could be illuminated as ways of reflecting upon the idea 
that it is as if everyone ought to agree to what is being said, but this 
form of “softer” or more “open” judgement should not trick us into 
thinking that what is going on is any less ideological.  
Indeed, does not this description capture a crucial feature of 
contemporary ideology, which seems to have incorporated the 
poststructuralist critique of the ‘70s and ‘80s? We have in fact 
learned that ‘woman’ is not a determinate category that prescribes 
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a clearly defined set of rules of conduct, e.g.,  cleaning, cooking, 
breeding, but nevertheless we often seem to act as if we precisely 
had not learned this.
There is more to be said about this softer form of inclusive vio-
lence, but the crucial point has been made.  What is described by 
Butler and many others as a certain kind of ethical violence can be 
translated into a no less violent, but perhaps more sinister form of 
aesthetic violence.  
Even more crucial for my present purpose, however, is the fact 
that what has been defined as ethical violence in the form of con-
demnations above can be adequately understood as aesthetic vio-
lence, where aesthetics is modelled upon the Kantian notion of the 
sublime.  As said above, condemnations, in the sense of “giving up 
upon” the other, precisely function in the way that they posit the 
other outside of the reach of disciplinary or even repressive vio-
lence.  The condemned ones are not even enemies in the Schmittian 
sense of political enemies (Schmitt 2007a, 36-7).  For Schmitt the po-
litical enemy is the one against whom one can go to war, but cru-
cially he is also one with whom one can make peace.  The political 
enemy is precisely not the one that is the target of extermination.  
In the post-9/11 environment of counter-terrorism it has more 
than once been argued that the terrorist enemies of the west pre-
cisely are not considered to be enemies in the Schmittian sense. 
Rather, they are targets of extermination.  It is at this point that the 
argument tends to turn “moral” or “ethical.” It is argued that it is 
because of the use of the concept ‘evil’ and the corresponding moral 
higher ground, which the speaker in question takes above the one’s, 
he is condemning, that violence takes this extreme form.  Schmitt 
himself made the argument that it is precisely when the enemy be-
comes a moral enemy that he becomes the target of extermination 
(Schmitt 2007a, 36-7; see also 2007b).  My point here is that the idea 
that this should be a moral or an ethical stance is weak.  The very 
idea that taking a moral higher ground should result in the kind of 
absolute condemnation of the other, where he becomes the object of 
possible extermination, seems weak to me.  To be on ethical higher 
ground means precisely to still recognise that the other is an ethical 
subject (regardless how one defines such a subject); the other may be 
less morally refined, but he counts as an ethical subject nonetheless. 
In the case of the absolute condemnation the other is no longer con-
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sidered as a subject, but rather simply as an object:  a disease, a pest 
and something to be destroyed rather than killed.  
It is at this point that we encounter the Kantian sublime:  the ex-
cessive externality which seems to be beyond the reach of our cog-
nitive capacities is the sublime.  It is that which I am incapable of 
understanding and which therefore leaves me with a feeling of 
wonder and fear.  Like virus or bacteria we do not relate to the ones 
we call evil as subjects.  We rather – and precisely – reflect on how 
they seem to be beyond the reach of our cognitive capacities.  We 
ask in (forced) bewilderment “Why do they hate us so?” and like 
that we make a sublime evil out of them.  The point is that this ma-
noeuvre precisely is not ethical.  It is rather an aesthetic one.  
Conclusion
A decade after 9/11, one of the crucial political challenges facing 
world politics is the status of law and right and especially human 
rights.  We have seen legal measures and forms of political repres-
sion emerge even in democratic states that have been severely criti-
cised by the institutions of international human rights law (see, e.g., 
ECHR Fourth Section, 2010; ECHR Grand Chamber 2009).  One 
could of course argue that the very fact that institutions such as the 
European Court of Human Rights are capable of intervening in this 
environment, and that they are actually doing it, should lead us to 
think that the system of international law is in fact working quite 
well.  Conversely, it can certainly also be argued that the fact that it 
is at all necessary for the court to intervene against the legislation 
and the practices of the courts and the police in a legal state such as 
the United Kingdom, calls for a heightened attention by the aca-
demic community concerning the current state of affairs in relation 
to human rights.
As I have pointed out, the standard way for the academic com-
munity to respond to this challenge has been to adopt an overall 
moralistic or ethical framework.  The argument I have put forward 
here seeks to show that it might be prudent to open up this frame-
work in a direction that draws as much upon aesthetic theory as it 
does upon theories of ethics.  In so many words we have many 
reasons to study closely the aesthetics of human rights.  
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